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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume 58 April, 1956 Number 3
PENDING PERIL AND THE RIGHT TO SEARCH
DWELLINGS*
MAX DEBERRY* AN) GEuARD 0. W. MuEmLmR 0
1. A VIrAL PROBLEm OF GEINAL PROCEDU]RE"" O
THE law of search and seizure is usually thought of as part
of the law of evidence. This is only partially correct. Basic-
ally, search and seizure are part of the body of rules constituting
*The technical nature of our topic makes it impossible to give a more
descriptive title. To inform the reader of the scope and import of this essay,
the following definitions and explanations are offered in advance:
Pending: Imminent rather than remote, as judged by reasonable appear-
ances and information.
Peril: A substantial danger to (a) human life; or (b) the administration
of justice, due to the great probability that a dangerous felon might escape
apprehension and trial, to the material detriment of the peace of the community.
Pending Peril: The term "clear and present danger" is somewhat analo-
gous, but has purposely not teen used here due to the fact that the first and
fourteenth amendments to the Federal Constitution have virtually monopolized
this phrase. Wood v. State, 77 Okla. Crim. 305, 141 P.2d 309, 318 (1943).
Nor would the construction of the word clear conform to the definition of
pending as given above.
Right: We suggest that this paper might well indicate that what is now
regarded as a dubious right to search, may well be not only a very substantial
right, but, under certain circumstances, even a duty.
Search: For the purpose of this paper the term search may be taken to
include the subsequent act of seizure, and the precedent act, under certain
circumstances, to enter, or to break and enter absent admission upon demand.
That, when a right to search under warrant exists, the right to break and enter
after denial, or in absence, of admission, exists also, has long been recognized.
E.g., 1 WHARTON, CRnMUNAL PROCEDURE 87-90 (10th ed., Kerr 1918). Without
the precedent right to gain entry, the subsequent rights to search and seize
would be meaningless. Hence, to the extent to which a right to search premises
exists, be it with or without warrant, the right to gain entry exists likewise. Ibid.
Dwellings: Homes presently occupied. We are not concerned with dwel-
lings used partially for business purposes. Nor shall we deal with third parties'
dwellings. See State v. Calandros, 86 S.E.2d 242, 245 (W. Va. 1955). Nor
are the rules with respect to incompleted, abandoned, or temporarily unoc-
cupied dwellings - see annotation, 33 A.L.R.2d 1430 (1954) - within the
scope of this paper. As is well known, the rules as to premises not presently
used as dwellings are commonly considered to be less stringent. A further limi-
tation is noted in note 2 infra.
::Judge, Third Judicial Circuit, Harrisville, West Virginia.
e*Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
""We wish to express our gratitude to Professor Roy Moreland. of the
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the law of criminal procedure, or criminal law enforcement or ad-
ministration. As such it is treated here. Truly, most frequently
the issue of the lawfulness of a search is raised by an objection to
the evidence. Thus, the rules of evidence constitute the leader
of the pack of watchdogs which guard the sanctity of the person
and the home against any undue invasion by law enforcement offi-
cers. All other controls, such as disciplinary, civil and criminal
remedies against officers, play, unfortunately, only a minor role.
The law of evidence, as understood by federal courts and a
minority of state courts, among them the West Virginia courts,
exclude evidence obtained by unreasonable searches and seizures,
Whatever the merits of this rule,-and no argument has been ad-
vanced yet which could lead to a rational conciliation between
the two opposing camps-we do not here propose to take a stand
on the rule of evidence. Nor do the theories here advanced require
either such a stand or even a switch of position. Whether illegally
obtained evidence ought to be excluded or not is not dependent
on the question: what constitutes an illegal search, or, what con-
stitutes a legal search.
It is the object of this inquiry to provide our prosecutors and
law enforcement officers with an ascertainable standard of their
duties. No comprehensive statute guides them through the legal
labyrinth of rules of search and seizure under an overly general
constitutional provision. The standard, as known thus far, is vague
and uncertain. Its component parts are widely scattered. The
law proceeded, for the most part, like that burlesque exaggeration
of the common law which Jeremy Bentham called "Dog Law":-
"When your dog does anything you want to break him of,
you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. This is the
way you make laws for your dog: and this is the way the
judges make law for you and me. They won't tell a man be-
forehand what it is he should not do-they won't so much as
allow of his being told: they lie by till he has done something
which they say he should not have done, and then they hang
University of Kentucky, College of Law, eminent authority in the field of
criminal law and procedure, for having made available to us the mimeographed
version of a chapter on the law of search and seizure, of Professor Moreland's
book on Criminial Procedure, which is in preparation. We were gratified to
note that we are in agreement with Pr6fessor Moreland on the salutaiy nature
of the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable 'searblids and sizurei in
dwellings. Like Pr6fessor2Morla'nd, . wb find' that dwllings nay bb searched
without warrant onl' "highl .xcepifonal cises." Th6 grdup4' ftlidse' excep-
ifonal cases constittiths ffie tbpic" of" tis paper.'
2
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him for it. What way, then, has any man of coming at this
dog-law? Only by watching their proceedings: by observing
in what cases they have hanged a man, in what cases they
have sent him to jail, in what cases they have seized his goods,
and so forth."'
Bentham's amusing caricature of one of the inherent weaknesses
of case law has its particular application to the law of search and
seizure. But if society expects adequate protection against harm
and violence, it must provide workable standards and adequate and
rational rules, so that it's servants, whom it has appointed to pro-
vide this protection, know beforehand what to do and what not
to do, else frustration and lawlessness will result. May the instant
discussion help in furnishing such a guide.
2. A PAcnc. QUFSTION-THE INADMISSIBLE CORPSE
Recently a young unwed mother was being tried in the Circuit
Court of Ritchie County, West Virginia, for the crime of man-
slaughter in connection with the death of her newly born child.
When evidence of the post mortem examination of the child's body
was offered, the objection was made that the body of the child
had been obtained by a search without a warrant, and that under
the federal and West Virginia rule evidence so obtained was inad-
missible. It appeared that upon being informed by a physician,
who had examined the young woman in Wood County, West Vir-
ginia, that she had very recently and in secret given birth to a
child, the sheriff of Ritchie County had rushed to the paternal home
of the young woman, which was her place of residence, but where
no one was present but minor children, and had searched for the
child which he found under an old phonograph and dead. The
search was without a warrant and without valid consent.
Did the sheriff have the right without a warrant to search for
the child in order to ascertain if it were still living, for the purpose
of taking action to preserve its life? If the sheriff had reason to
believe it dead, could he, without a warrant, search for the body?
If a warrant were necessary, could it have been obtained?
This case has constituted a lively topic of discussion among the
members of the West Virginia' bar. We have reason to suspect that
the problem is not confined to the case at hand, nor to Ritchie
1 5 Worms oF Tramm BENTHAm 235 (Bowring ed. 1838-1848).
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County, nor, indeed, to West Virginia. Yet, a preliminary check
of the standard treatises revealed a dearth of helpful information
on the topic. The law in the books, by inference, seems to be in-
consonant with a practical solution. Is, then, this situation one of
the instances evidencing the often mentioned divergence between
the law in the books and the law in action?
3. PROBLEM QUESTON
To properly circumscribe the exact limitations of the points of
law which we propose to discuss, it will be well to phrase two
specific questions:
(a) Where a law enforcement officer has been informed by a
reputable person about facts which indicate that human life may
be in imminent danger at this instant, in a certain dwelling house,
and the officer promptly rushes to the dwelling, demands admis-
sion, and, there being no response, enters and searches, not pri-
marily to make an arrest, but principally to find and save the en-
dangered person, is such a search lawful?
(b) In exactly the same situation as above, except with further
information to the effect that the endangered person is already
dead, and that the person responsible for the death is, or is likely
to be, in the process of removing the body, in which case the officer
searches only for the body, is the search lawful? 2
4. THE LAw iN THE Boors
"The rights of the citizens to be secure in their houses, per-
sons, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated."3
2 The fact that a dead body, or, as in the first problem question, a po-
tentially dead body, is the object of the search, indicates another limitation in
this paper, namely, the distinction between objects and fruits of the crime on
the one hand, and mere evidence of crime, such as a suspect's diary, on the
other. We are dealing only with the former category. Whether the distinction
between the two categories is justified or not, seems to be no longer subject to
debate. Courts have tended to apply stricter rules as to things merely evi-
dencing crime, e.g., letters, documents, books, etc., but lawfully owned and
possessed by the person searched. An extension of these stricter rules to objects
and fruits of crime must be guarded against. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1885); United States v. Thomson, United States v. Craig, 113 F.2d 643,
129 A.L.R. 1291 (7th Cir. 1940). The annotation to the latter case, at 129
A.L.R. 1296, is a valuable and informative discussion in point.
3W. VA. CONST. art. II, § 6, identical with the fourth amendment to
the Federal Constitution. Emphasis supplied.
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Some writers and lawyers seem to believe that any search of a
dwelling is unlawful at common law:
"The poorest man may, in his cottage,
Bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown.
It may frail;
Its roof may shake;
The winds may blow through it;
The storm may enter;
But the King of England may not enter;
All his forces dare not cross
the threshold of the ruined tenement."4
Unfortunately-or perhaps fortunately-poetry does not help us
to solve concrete cases. Nor does it tell us what the law has been
and what it presently is.
In West Virginia the phrase "unreasonable searches" seems to
have been construed to include "[a] ny search of a person's house
without a valid search warrant."5 But this is, at the most, a state-
ment of the general rule as presently understood. A number of
exceptions to the search warrant requirement have long been judi-
cially recognized. Thus, (1) a search of a dwelling without a war-
rant is lawful where there is consent by a person legally entitled
and capable to grant it." (2) Some search of the person and the
room of the home wherein he is found is permitted, and virtually
required for the safety of our law enforcement officers, as an inci-
dent to a lawful arrest, and no special search warrant is required.7
(3) A search of a dwelling without a warrant is permitted where
any of his senses inform an officer of the law that a felony is being
committed. (4) Finally, a "mobile" home-ship, 'wagon, trailer
(?) - may be searched without a warrant under proper circum-
stances.9
It will be noticed that while the first of these exceptions is based
on an absence of insistence on official force, the latter three rest
4From Chatham's Speech on General Warrants, quoted in State v.
Littleton, 108 W. Va. 494, 498, 151 S.E. 713 (1930).
5 State v. Slat, 98 W. Va. 448, 449, 127 S.E. 191 (1923); and see State v.
Littleton, supra note 4; State v. Joseph, 100 W. Va. 213, 218-219, 130 S.E.
451 (1925); State v. Wills, 91 W. Va. 659, 669, 114 S.E. 261 (1922).0 State v. Littleton, note 4 supra, at 497-498.
7 State v. Adams, 103 W. Va. 77, 136 S.E. 703, 51 A.L.R. 407 (1927).
8 State v. Thomas, 105 W. Va. 346, 143 S.E. 88 (1928). A still in opera-
tion; odor attracted officers who entered and seized in D's absence.
9 State v. Joseph, note 5 supra, at 218-219, citing AgneUo v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
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on what may be termed pending peril. An arrested felon is likely
to be armed. The officer's life is in danger until he makes sure that
the arrestee is unarmed. The life of the officer is a greater interest
than the immunity of the arrestee against search and seizure. This
weighing of two interests equally protected by the constitution in
favor of the right to search--thus, in favor of hiuman life-is as much
a matter of common sense-hence, this search is not "unreasonable"
in common parlance-, as it is a matter of proper and practical con-
stitutional costruction. 0 More than that, by weighing the inter-
ests of society, acting through its officer, against the individual's rec-
ognized opposing interest in extreme cases, society does nothing
but protect itself against disintegration for the ultimate benefit of
all its individual members. This, indeed, is the very foundation of
society and its laws." The pending peril in the second exception
is, thus, a peril to life. It is noteworthy that in order to avert this
peril, the arresting officer may search the arrestee's person as well
as "the premises under his immediate control."12
In the third exception there also is clearly a pending peril, namely
one which is directed against the administration of criminal justice
itself.'3 The perpetrator whose crime has been detected and who,
as is frequently the case, gains knowledge of the detection, would
have ample opportunity to remove the evidence of his criminal
activity if the officer of the law were to depart from the scene in
order to obtain a search warrant. The result would be an im-
possibility to convict known offenders, whether they illegally dis-
tilled intoxicating, liquor, traded in narcotics, attempted arson, or
perpetrated a murder.
10 Accord, Marshall v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 541, 549, 125 S.E. 329
(1924).
11 See Mueller, The Problem of Value Judgments as Norms of Law: The
Answer of a Positivist, 7 J. LEzAL ED. 567, 571 (1955).
12 State v. Adams, note 7 supra, at 79-80. The scope of such a search and
seizure, sanctioned by the law of this state, goes considerably further than any
pending peril requires. Yet, nobody would contend that the rule, so stated by
Judge Litz of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, is an unreasonable
one.
13 The phrase peril against the administration of justice is a sweeping one.
History has taught that it can be subject to much abuse. We advocate no such
use of the phrase. As used and understood here in connection with the law of
search and seizure, it applies only to the danger of the destruction of tools or
fruits of crime which would enable a highly suspected felon to escape a trial
which alone can result in an adjudication of guilt. It is to be furtler noted
that the phrase is used in connection with reasonable searches and seizures. Its
scope, thus, is limited by the reasonableness of the circumstances under which
the officer of the law acts. See note * supra, under peril.
6
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The fourth exception is self-explanatory. Again, the pending peril
toward law enforcement is its rationale. Removal of the mobile
home out of the jurisdiction would not only be likely but certain,
where its owner has reason to believe that the evidence of crime
in his home will be seized shortly, i.e., after procurement of a war-
rant by the detecting officer.
It is at once apparent that our problem question (a), supra, in-
volves a case of pending peril toward human life. Indeed, pro-
vided the information given to the officer is reliable-of which the
officer must, of necessity, be the initial judge' 4-the probability of
death absent intervention by the officer here is considerably more
urgent and much larger than in cases falling under the second
exception to the warrant requirement. Yet, problem question (a)
involves no arrest for felony. Thus, it would seem that the officer
can not intervene without a warrant, unless some other proposition
of law would dispense with the duty to obtain a search warrant.
Similarly, in our problem question (b) the pending peril toward
the due enforcement of the criminal laws for the protection of
the peace of the community is as large as in cases under excep-
tion(s) three (and four) to the warrant requirement. But since
none of his senses15 has warned the officer of the commission of a
felony, and since the commission of the felonious homicide has
ended,' 6 the suggested case does not fall within the recognized
exception, and a search warrant seems necessary.
14 To the effect that a peace officer in the execution of his duties is
presumed to act in good faith, that in situations requiring immediate action
the officer is primarily the judg, and that "[h]is conduct must be weighed
in the light of the circumstances under which he acted and not measured by
subsequently developed facts," see Barboursville v. Taylor, 115 W. Va. 4,
174 S.E. 485 (1934), and cases cited there. "When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent. [But t]here
are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective
law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a
magistrate's warrant of search may be dispensed with." Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1947).
15 Strangely enough, the law does not accept the brain power, or reasoning
ability (common sense, if you wish), as one of the human senses which may
lawfully warn a police officer of the present commission of a crime. Where
lies the distinction between seeing the commission of a crime and seeing objects,
movements, or occurrences from which the commission of a crime can be
inferred?
16 Lip service is being paid to the mandate that the felony must be in
progress. In State v. Thomas, note 8 supra, the officers smelled the odor of
moonshine in the making, entered the building whence the odors came, found
a still in operation, and seized it. Nobody but the officers was on the premises.
7
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5. A Dnm-sw-de "maximi' non curat lex
So far we have assumed that it may be legally possible to obtain
search warrants in the cases suggested by our problem questions,
even though it would seem to be factually impossible, nay ridicu-
lous, due to the emergency of the situations, to attempt to obtain
a warrant under these circumstances. But is it certain that warrants
will be issued in our suggested cases of capital offenses?
Under West Virginia statutes search warrants may be issued for
such heinous and divers items as intoxicating liquor, fighting cocks,
counterfeit coins, books containing obscene language, pornographic
prints, branded bottles, a bingo or lottery ticket, and many other
articles too numerous to mention.'7 No West Virginia statute
authorizes a search warrant for such innocuous items as a destruc-
tive bomb, poisonous gas, inflammable or explosive substance, a
dead human body, or a child in imminent danger of wrongful death.
It would seem to be reasonably safe to say that the common law
maxim de minimis non curat lex has no application to the statutory
law of search and seizure in this state. To the contrary, de "maxi-
m" non curat lex would seem to be the rule if the statutorily enu-
merated items constitute the entire slate of articles subject to search.
One line of authority seems to support such a fantastic conclusion:
"Search warrants were unknown to the common law. Even
searching for stolen goods crept into the law by imperceptible
practice; and Lord Coke denied its legality. 4 Inst. 176. Judge
Cooley says: 'But as search warrants are a species of process
exceedingly arbitrary in character . . . the rules of law which
pertain to them are of more than ordinary strictness ...
Const. Limitations, (7th ed.), 429."18
Under rules of extraordinary strict construction are we to believe
that search for the enumerated pitiful items is lawful-by statute-
The court held that a felony was presently being committed in the building.
How can that be? A present felony in the building needs a presert felon right
then and there, as a felony can not possibly commit itself. It is suggested that
a felony had been committed when the felon was present, and that a felony
was to be committed again upon the felon's resumption of his illicit labors.
But logic had to give way to practicability, and reasonably so. State v. Thomas
is sound in result. Unfortunately, no analogy can be drawn to. the mere
presence of a corpse. By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that the
felonious homicide is still being committed as long as the body is present.
17 The more important of these items are listed in W. VA. CoDE c. 62,
art. 1, § 18 (Michie 1955).
18State v. Moran, 103 W. Va. 753, 757, 138 S.E. 366 (1927), deletions
ours.
8
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and that search for much more noxious items is unlawful-absent
specific statutory authority?
6. PRoPERTY SuBJEr To SFARCH
The existence of statutes listing such harmless and innocuous
items as proper objects for the issuance of search warrants, and the
absence of statutes naming human corpses, time bombs, murder
weapons, etc., can lead to only one reasonable inference: the legisla-
ture assumed that for heinous and destructive articles searches with
or without warrant may be made as a matter of course, by the com-
mon law. Since the present statements of the law of search and seizure
are usually based on broad dicta rendered during the prohibition
era, we had to consult pre-prohibition text books and treatises, in
order to find out what the common law rule of search and seizure
encompassed, particularly at the time of enactment of the various
pieces of legislation which comprise our present body of statutory
law on the topic. The state of the law at that time furnishes the
clue to the understanding of these isolated statutes. In so inquiring,
we followed the well known maxim that in the interpretation of any
statutory or constitutional provision, it is of prime importance to
inquire what the state of the law was, and what other contempo-
raneous circumstances existed, at the time of enactment.' A search
of the older sources proved rewarding. Mr. Wharton, then the prin-
cipal authority on criminal procedure, stated:
"The police power of the state extends to the search for
seizure . . . of any and all property which is the subject of
crime, or is the means of perpetrating a crime."20
In Clark's Criminal Procedure the common law rule is described
as follows:
"At common law, in order to recover stolen property, or, it
seems, to procure evidence of crime, a magistrate . . . may
issue a warrant... to make a search for and seize the property
described in the warrant .... [I] n addition to this there are
statutes authorizing search warrants in cases not covered by
the common law, such as warrants to search for and seize
intoxicating liquors, lottery tickets, gambling apparatus, etc.,
kept in violation of law."21
19 State v. Harden, 62 W. Va. 313, 323, 58 S.E.2d 715 (1907); see
State v. Kees, 92 W. Va. 277, 281, 114 S.E. 617, 27 A.L.R. 681 (1922).
20 1 WURTON, Cmunm.AL PaocErtux 91 (10th ed., Kerr 1918), citing,
inter alia, Fulton v. State, 171 Ala. 572, 54 So. 688 (1911).2 1 CLRK, Cn.mr.AL PRocDutrE 68 (1895).
9
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It is understandable that no text writer at that time could furnish
long lists of precedents. Prior to the prohibition era the problem
of search and seizure arose rarely. But though the rules stated
above may be supported by but few precedents, they have the sup-
port of reason, and the name of the common law.
With the knowledge of the common law rule as understood
in pre-prohibition times, particularly during te second half of the
nineteenth century, it is now easy to explain the apparent discrep-
ancy. By the common law property subject to crime, or used for
crime, was also subject to search and seizure. There is no reason
to believe that the legislators were ignorant of the rules so stated
in the leading text books of the day. When the common law list
of crimes was enlarged by new statutory crimes, it was felt that
the common law list of property subject to search had to be enlarged
accordingly. Thus, as Clark indicated in the quoted excerpt, stop-
gap statutes were passed to extend the law of search and seizure
to the newly created offenses. This, then, explains our list of statutes
making innocuous items, objects of statutory petty offenses, proper
items of search and seizure, and the absence of similar statutes cov-
ering serious common law crimes.
It is here not disputed that in days long bygone the only prop-
erty subject to search and seizure may have been stolen property. 22
But certainly by the end of the nineteenth century, and probably
long before then, the practice in the trial courts had extended the
list of objects to the scope indicated by Wharton and Clark. Even
in England, in the face of a number of decisions by courts of highest
authority to the contrary, police and trial court practice had long
since discarded the larceny limitation.23 There the proposition that
the right to search extends to objects other than the fruits of larceny
and offenses mentioned by special statute, has become common-
place.2 4
22 Wade, Police Search, 50 L.Q. REv. 354, 357 (1934).
23 Id. at 366, quoting c. IV, §§ 120-121 of the REPORT OF TnIE ROYAL
COMMSSION ON POLICE PowEs AND PROCEDURE (1929).
24 Although illegally obtained evidence appears to be admissible under
the English rule, one would expect some language in the cases expressive of a
limitation to certain articles and crimes, if there were such limitations. But
there is practically complete silence on the point in the English cases. The
absence of trespass actions against police officers for taking property other than
that specified by stop-gap statutes, or stolen property, lends further support to
our conclusion. Gen. see Wade, supra note 22.
10
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Perhaps it is unfortunate that the proposition became, by neces-
sity, reason, and long continued practice, so firmly embedded in
lower court practice that nobody, in recent years, dared any con-
test on the appellate level. But, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter re-
cently reminded us, "'law is not restricted to what is found in Law
Reports."25
In West Virginia we are, however, fortunate enough to have
some judicial indication as to the type of property which is subject
to search and seizure. In State v. Adams the court dealt with the
right to search that part of the dwelling of a defendant in which
he was arrested. The court listed the following items as proper
objects of search and seizure:
" . . evidence inseparably connected with the corpus
delicti of the crime charged, such as the instrument with which
the crime has been committed, articles of evidentiary value
connected therewith, the fruits of the crime, dangerous %veap-
ons, stolen goods, articles which might enable a prisoner to
escape, or evidence to identify the prisoner."26
The fact that the search was incidental to arrest, rather than under
warrant-a fact which might be regarded as limiting the list of seiz-
able goods strictly to weapons-did not influence the court, and
properly so, for the reason that the incriminating property so found
in an incidental manner is no less trustworthy than property which
was the object of a specific pointive search under warrant. There
is no reason, legal or otherwise, which would necessitate different
lists of property subject to search and seizure for cases resting in-
herently on the same principles, even though depending on the
vagaries of the situation as to the impetus for the exercise of the
right.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
properly summarized the rule in United States v. Thomson:
"A valid search may result in the seizure of papers as well
as other kinds of property. The test is not the nature of the
property seized (papers or liquor for instance), but whether
such property was by the accused used in perpetrating a
crime 27
It follows that in West Virginia, as elsewhere, the proper judi-
2 5 Concurring opinion in Bernhardt v. Polygraph Co. of America, 76 Sup.
Ct. 278, 280.(1956).
26 103 W. Va. 77, 79-80, 136- S. E. 703, 51 A;L.'R; 407 (1927).
27 113 F.2d 64,3, 645 (7th Cir. 1940).
11
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cial officers have the power to issue search warrants for all articles
specifically mentioned by statute, as well as for articles which are
the objects of common law crimes .2
7. SEARCH OF A DwELLING WITHOUT A WARRANT
Having settled that items like dead or dying human beings,
time bombs and dangerous weapons are just as much proper objects
of search and seizure as fighting cocks and soft drink bottles, we
are now faced with the far more difficult question as to the scope
of the right to search private dwellings without a warrant. At the
outset we have noted that four exceptions to the warrant require-
ment are being recognized virtually everywhere; and we have seen
that these exceptions-apart from the consent exception-rest on a
concept which we have called pending peril. The question now
2 8 Who may issue search warrants in cases of common law crimes?-A
collateral West Virginia dilemma. By statute the duty, or power, to issue
search warrants falls primarily upon justices of the peace. W. VA. CODE c. 62,
art. 1, § 13 (Michie 1955). But, as has been amply discussed, the statute
fails to mention all common law offenses, save larceny. Since the statute is
silent on all other common law felonies, does it follow that only circuit courtjudges-already overburdened as they are-can issue such warrants? Or dojustices have the power? An often repeated slogan seems to deny justices this
power. "The powers of a justice are such only as are expressly conferred by
statute." 11 MIcTe's JUtISPRUDENCE, VIRGMNIA AND WEST VMGINIA, Jus-
tices § 8. This statement is a weasel phrase. Michie's Jurisprudence is unable
to cite any direct authority in support thereof. Indeed, neither the Constitu-
tion, nor any statute, contains any such mandate. Cases which have used the
phrase rest on premises entirely different from those involved here. E. g.,
cases like Norfolk & V. Ry. v. Pinnacle Coal Co., 44 W. Va. 574, 30 S. E. 196,
41 L.R.A. 414 (1898), deal with powers once possessed by justices, by
common law or statute, which were later abolished by the legislature. Such is
not the case with respect to the power to issue search warrants. Under W. VA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 28, justices "shall be conservators of the peace and have
such jurisdiction and powers in criminal cases as may be prescribed by law."(Emphasis supplied.) While this sentence undeniably encompasses future
acts of the legislature, it includes, by being phrased in the subjunctive moodof the present tense, all such powers which at the time presently existed, by
reason of common law or statute. This provision of the Constitution of 1872
was copied, almost verbatim, from the Constitution of 1863, art. VII, § 9,constituting the first mention of the jurisdiction and power of justices under
West Virginia law. There can be no doubt about the meaning of this provision.The same dr ftsmen who wrote the C nstituti n of 1863, also wrote the Act of
December 7, 1863, which reads: "The common law and statute laws now inforce relating to... the power.., of justces ... , shall continue in force so
far as they are not inconsistent with this act. W. Va. Acts 1863, c. 122, § 239.
Since no argument can be made that any statute was in force then, or has been
enacted since, which is inconsistent with the common law power of justices toissue warrants-subject only to constitutional limitations, State v. Kees, note 22
supra-such rights exist in justices of the peace in West Virginia today. That
justices had such common law powers is not in dispute. See HEnNO, Naw
VIRGnItA JusrTCE 524-525 (1810); 2 HALE, FLEAS OF THE CROWN/ 149(Emlyn ed. 1778).
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presents itself: are other exceptions tacitly recognized, or did they
exist prior to the enunciation of the present hornbook rule?
As has been indicated, the present rules of our law of search
and seizure have been formulated during the era of the prohibition
latws relative to intoxicating liquors, with crimes which are not the
subject of universal condemnation and were, perhaps, not con-
demned too bitterly by anyone. As sentiment against the prohibition
laws and their interference with the private lives and habits of the
citizens was mounting, the courts were found to be increasingly
diligent in protecting private property, but particularly the sanctity
of the home, against searches and seizures. An emotional attitude,
resulting, we assume, from the severe penalties of the prohibition
laws, led to more and more safeguards against conviction for vio-
lation. During the course of this reaction the courts made many
broad general statements which went far beyond the immediate
necessities of the cases under discussion. Digest compilers followed
suit and undertook to proclaim such dicta to be the law of the land.
Thus, a situation was created where not only unreasonable searches
were prohibited, but where even many reasonable searches became
of questionable legality.
We do agree with such broad general statements to the extent
that there are few, if any, cases involving intoxicating liquor, and
other instances similar in nature, where there could be any inherent
necessity for search without a warrant. If, on the other hand, an
officer of the law, having reason to believe that life is in imminent
danger, or that a homicide has occurred, and that an early examina-
tion of the body is necessary in the investigation of the crime, par-
ticularly to preserve the evidence, must obtain a search warrant,
where can be found the example of the reasonable search which
our constitutions allow?
In State v. Mason Judge Miller of the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals explained: "In any of the cities and towns in
this state it is a very simple matter and takes but a few minutes
to secure a search warrant when one is needed."29 We concur with
Judge Miller, except for the last four words. When the need for a
search warrant arises, the procurement procedure can usually not
be reduced to a few minutes. Criminals do not arrange the com-
mission of their offenses according to the office hours of the justices
of the peace. Nor are they accommodating, geographically, in the
2" 10.3 W. Va. 753, 758, 138 S.E. 366 (1927).
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places they select. Nor will they stay all activity directed toward
the removal of evidence until the peace officer has returned with
a warrant-not even for a few minutes.
It must be asked, was it necessary in pursuit of a reasonable
enforcement of the prohibition laws to announce a rule which would
preclude any search of a dwelling, the four narrow exceptions not-
withstanding, no matter what the exigencies of the situation?
According to Cornelius, who wrote in the prohibition era, the
law permits of no other exception.30 A recent writer is in accord,3'
and so are most current texts and encyclopedias.
But such statements are not consonant with the common law
rule of pre-Volstead days. Mr. Wharton said:
'Probable immediate danger of a felony, or breach of the
peace, or other grave offense existing, the officer, giving notice
of his character, may enter [a dwelling] without a [scarch]
warrant."32
Be the reader reminded that this rule has not been drowned
in alcohol, nor have the books been burned which evidence the
common law. Wharton and his contemporaries relied for this rule
on cases from both the law of search and seizure and of arrest. In
fact, a century or so ago little distinction seems to have been made
between cases of arrest and cases of search and seizure, within
the field of criminal procedure.3 3 The sanctity of the person seems
to have been at a par with the sanctity of the home-which under
modem law of arrest certainly is no longer the case-and rules of
law and precedents seem to have circulated freely between the
two categories of cases. The reason is obvious. Apart from the
analogy, the search is merely a preliminary step to the arrest. If
the search is successful, arrest will follow necessarily.
This historical fact should lead us to a present-day comparison
between the two different spheres, in an effort to gain further insight.
3 0 CoRNE~rus, SEARcH Am SEizuREc . VI (2d ed. 1930).
31 MACnrN, THE LAW OF SEARCiH Am SEzURE e. 2 and 3 (1950).
32 1 WHARTON, CRUMNAL PROCEDURE 89 (10th ed., Kerr 1918). For
authority Wharton crossrefers to his work on (substantive) criminal law.
1 WHARTON, CRmIMAL LAW § 566 (11th ed., Kerr 1912, has been used in our
research).
33 For example, the Bill of Rights, adopted by the Virginia Constitutional
Convention on June 27, 1788, and attached to the resolution of June 26, 1788,
ratifying the Federal Constitution, in article 14, speaks of ",l... warrants...
to search suspected places, or seize any freeman, his papers or property."
Such a commingling of arrest and search- and seizure is indicative of the unity
of thought and theory with which the topics were viewed at that time.
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8. THE ARREST ANALOGY
Under the constitutional clause which declares that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law,34 no arrest can ordinarily be made without a warrant. To
that general rule, however, many exceptions, arising out of neces-
sity, are recognized by the courts.
"[I] t appears that an arrest without a warrant is lawful,
(1) where a felony has been committed,
(2) where it is being committed,
(3) where it is about to be committed,
(4) when a misdemeanor is committed in the presence of an
officer, and,
(5) where a breach of the peace is imminent."1
To justify an arrest upon a felony charge without a warrant it is
only necessary that the officer have reason to believe (including
information) that a felony has been committed.3 6 The reasons for
the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for arrest seem rea-
sonably apparent. They arise from the inherent necessity of the
situation. Where the immediate necessity to preserve life, or to
prevent infringements upon the liberty of others, is greater than
the desirability of protecting the liberty of the individual, the bal-
ancing suggested in Johnson v. United States occurs,3 7 and the
arrest without a warrant is permitted. It is noteworthy that these
exceptions to the warrant requirement in the law of arrest are again
all cases of pending peril to human life, or to the due enforcement
of the criminal laws for the preservation of the peace of the com-
munity. If there were no better ground on which to base a reason-
able search and seizure rule, would it not be compelling analogy
to reason in one case exactly as in the other? namely: where there
is reason to believe that the immediate necessity to preserve life,
or to prevent infringements upon the liberty of others, is greater
34 W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 10, identical with provisions in the fifth and
fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution.35 Byrd v. Commonwealth, 158 Va. 897, 164 S.E. 400, 402 (1932), and
authorities cited there.36 State v. McCauley, 130 W. Va. 401, 43 S.E.2d 454 (1947); State v.
Spangler, 120 W. Va. 72, 197 S.E. 360 (1938); State v. Lutz, 85 W. Va. 330,
101 S.E. 434 (1919); Allen v. Lopinsky, 81 W. Va. 13, 13, 91 S.E. 369 (1917).
For an able discussion see Lugar, Arrest Withiout a Warrant in West Vira' ;"'
48 W. VA. L.Q. 207 (1942).
37 Note 14 supra.
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than the desirability of protecting the right of one who, according
to all reasonable appearances, has offended, and forfeited this
right, and has created this infringement upon the right of others,
an officer of the law may take emergency measures of a preliminary
nature against the putative offender.
But, as has been shown, no reasoning by analogy is needed
to provide a proper foundation for a rational search and seizure rule.
This has been done a century or more ago, and we merely are called
upon to reassert the rule. Before attempting to delineate and to
formulate the rule of law, it is important to call attention to one
further almost forgotten basic legal concept which had a most
important influence on the development of the law of search and
seizure, which, indeed, is its sine qua non.
9. THE POLiCE DUTY TO PorEcr LiER, LmERTY AND PRoPErY
The power to search for, and to seize, the tools and fruits of
crime, is one of the governmental powers, exercised by duly ap-
pointed agents, for the common weal and the protection of life, lib-
erty and property of every individual citizen. All too frequently
this underlying purpose has been forgotten, and the search and
seizure rules are regarded as themselves an infringement of the
rights which they are designed to protect. It is necessary to keep
the proper relation in mind. This governmental function of which
we speak is nothing but the age-old duty of society towards its
members. Rarely is it clothed in terms of a rule of law in the cate-
gory of duty on the part of the state, though in. terms of the corre-
sponding right in the individual citizen it is known to all of us in
form of the due process clause of the Constitution, both federal
and state. Professor Perkins, in his work on the Elements of Police
Science, called this societal function, or duty, a
"... species of governmental activity which has for one
of its chief objects the protection of the lives, limbs, health
and comfort of all persons and the protection of all property
within the state."s8
3 8 Pmnarnrs, EimNms OF PoLIcE ScIEcN VII (1942). One of the best
known formulations is that of the great codifiers Suarez and Klein, as contained
in the Prussian Territorial Code of 1794, pt. II, t. 17, § 10, enacted thirty-five
years prior to the establishment of the first police force in the common law
world by Sir Robert Peel, London 1829. This section reads: "It is the duty
of police to take the necessary and proper measure for the maintenance of pub-
lic peace, safety and order, and to avert perils threatening the public or its
members."
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Such, indeed, has been the duty of the state, and the object
of its police power, from the days of the ancient Greek polis to the
twentieth century American city. It is entirely above any question
of political organization or doctrine. It is this police power which
binds the fire department to rush to a flaming house, to break and
enter, to search for the source of the flames and to extinguish them,
and, indeed, to seize any evidence of arson on the spot. Yet, nobody
has contended that here we are confronted with a question of
(unlawful) search and seizure.39 It is this police duty also which
binds the peace officer to protect the life of the citizen, 40 to ap-
prehend his kidnappers, to protect the citizen's property against
burglars, and to break doors and enter houses in order to rescue
the citizen from the clutches of a homicidal attacker. And again,
nobody would be bold enough to assert that the citizen is protected
in his home against rescuers.
The rule of law, phrased in terms of search and seizure, as
well as arrest, which has emerged from this basic police duty, has
become known as the emergency call "from within" doctrine: where
in an emergency the police is called by an occupant or other person
within the dwelling, it has a right, nay a duty, to enter.41 But it
is probably impractical to demand an emergency call "from within"
in all cases. Clearly, if the fire department is alarmed by a neigh-
bor, it may nevertheless break the doors of the burning dwelling;
and when the call for help is issued by a passer-by who witnessed
a homicidal attack within a building through an open picture
window, the police must enter.
There is no right and no duty in any system of law which
could not become the subject of abuse. It is not our task to deter-
mine where the limits lie. But in one respect we can voice certainty:
when a police officer obtains certain knowledge of a grave and
pending peril inside a dwelling, which permits of no delay, it is
his duty to enter, or to break and enter after having been refused
admission, to search, to seize, and, when possible, to arrest. Under
this rule it can make no difference that the call came from without,
that the information obtained may be only highly, but not absolutely,
39 See Judge HoltzofFs dissenting opinion in District of Columbia v. Little.
178 F.2d 13, 24-25 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
40 Though the recent New York case of Schuster v. New York, 286 App.
Div. 389, 143 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1955), has cast some doubt upon any such.
duty. See comment 58 W. VA. L. Rev. 305 (1956).
4' See McDonald v. United States, 385 U.S. 451, 454 (1948). For an
analogy-search of a dwelling by consent, but without call-see note 6 ipla.
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certain, that the criminal who created the peril is the owner and oc-
cupant of the premises, or that he may have quickly escaped through
the rear-door. As to the nature of the peril we can render only an
informed surmise: it certainly exists where human life is in danger
certainly when the dwelling itself is in danger (arson, bombing,
etc.), and certainly where delay might enable a person suspected
of felonious homicide to escape the course of justice, i.e., where
the officer's departure from the scene might enable the suspect to
dispose of the evidence. We can hardly imagine a non-capital crime
which could fall within the pending peril rule. On the other hand,
any capital offense, or the attempt to commit such an offense, or
any crime likely to result in a capital offense, is subject to the state's
emergency police power to enter private dwellings for rescue and
relief ancillary to obtaining judicial process.
10. FEDEntAL STAzmADs-GooD FArrH PLUS NiEcxssrrY
These considerations, particularly those resting on the com-
mon law of search and seizure, as delimited by the constitutions,
but also those based on the police duty of the state, have found
some judicial expression, and are phrased in terms of reasonable-
ness. The United States Supreme Court has been the leader in the
development of this standard, though unfortunately rather general,
test. This test rests on the premise that
"... it is only unreasonable searches and seizures which
come within the constitutional interdict. The tests of reasonable-
ness cannot be stated in rigid and absolute terms. 'Each case is
to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.' Go-Bart
Importing Company v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 357
(1931).
"The Fourth Amendment has never been held to require
that every valid search and seizure be effected under the
authority of a search warrant."42
A number of eminent judges have given us further leads. Rea-
sonableness, it appears, consists of two factors: good faith and
necessity.
(a) Good Faith.
"The authority [to search] must be confined to narrow
limits and utmost good faith exacted.... The restraint can
1 Mr. Chief Justice'Vinsbn in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150(:1946). This case involved a search incidental to arrest.
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best be imposed by an inquiry into the bona fides of the de-
clared purposes of the search and the trial court is the first
and best judge of whether the challenged search was reason-
ably incident to its permissible purposes."43
Frequently the standard of good faith becomes the criterion
of distinction between pointed and exploratory searches. 44 For exam-
ple, in our sample case (a) the officer of the law would appear to
be justified to search for an infant body on the premises where the
body is reported to be. Such a pointive search would not justify
the officer to search all parts and objects of the premises. Clearly,
a search of the pockets of all clothing within the premises would
become an exploratory search not necessitated by the, original pur-
pose of the undertaking. Extension of a pointive search to an
exploratory search, however, is merely one of the many possible
instances evidencing lack of good faith of the searching officer.
More obvious examples of bad faith are easily imaginable.
(b) Necessity. Good faith alone will not make the search
of a dwelling reasonable, unless the necessity of the situation de-
mands immediate action, rather than procurement of a search
warrant. The courts in the various jurisdictions have viewed neces-
sity through different glasses. An investigation of the rules in all
those of the fifty-two American jurisdictions which may have declared
their position is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it
to repeat that, as stated initially, the West Virginia court has had
occasion to recognize three such instances, or distinct groups of
cases of necessity, namely cases of arrest, cases of sensing a present
felony, and cases involving mobile homes. We have seen that the
pending peril in such situations provides the rationale and explana-
tion of the general term necessity.
But the United States Supreme Court has announced repeat-
edly that cases of necessity, or pending peril, can not be conveniently
fitted into ready molds. Federal appellate courts have also indicated
that the group of exceptions to the warrant requirement is not closed.
In District of Columbia v. Little Judge Prettyman speaks of the
right to invade a private home in "an immediate major crisis in the
43 Harris v. United States, 151 F.2d 837, 840-841, 169 A.L.R. 1413
(10th Cir. 1945). Emphasis supplied. By these standards the Court of Appeals
held that the trial couit had properly found such good faith (bona fides) in
the officers. By the same standards the United States Supreme Court affirmed,
note 42 supra.
44Ibid.; Maron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
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performance of duty [which] affords neither time nor opportunity
to apply to a magistrate." 5 In McDonald v. United States Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas spoke of cases in which officers are "responding to an
emergency' or when there are ",other compelling reasons" (by
the latter, presumably, referring to the already classified three in-
stances). 0 Mr. Justice Jackson conceived of "exceptional circum-
stances,"47 and "urgent circumstances." 48 The courts did not leave
us in doubt about the nature of such exceptional circumstances.
In addition to the already categorized, i. e., adjudicated, three groups
of cases, there seems to be a fourth residuary group of cases, com-
prised of the following elements:
(a) "evidence or contraband [is] threatened with removal
or destruction;"49
(b) "evidence of [the] existence [of crime] . . .would
perish [by reason of] the delay of getting a warrant;" 0
(c) in an exceptional circumstance, permitting of no delay
judges (or commissioners) are not readily available; 5'
(d) officers are responding to an emergency call for help.5 2
So far no court on the appellate level has answered either of
the two questions which we posed at the outset But, in view of
all indications given by highest judicial authority, and as outlined
above, can there be any doubt about the outcome of any such case?
CONCLUSION
In this essay we have endeavored to clarify an obscure area
of the law of criminal procedure, and to state to the best of our
abilities the rules of law of today. Courts necessarily have restricted
their statements to the facts at hand, textbook writers have shunned
the problem for its obscurity, or have relied on statements from an
era which this nation has outgrown. The prohibition is no longer
with us, nor the need for "snap judgments" and "straight jacket
interpretations."53 It is safe to leave the standard of haggard mor-
45 Note 39 supra, at 17.
40 Note 41 supra, at 454.
4 7 Joluson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1947).48 McDonald v. United States, note 41 supra, at 459, concurring opinion.
49 Jolmson v. United States, note 47 supra, at 15.
50 ibid.
51 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 703 (1948); and see Steeber v.
United States, 198 F.2d 615, 33 A.L.R.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1952).52 McDonald v. United States, note 41 supra, at 454-455.
53 Purr=Amwt, ADMRnSTRAl'ON OF CRMuwAL LAw 82 (1953).
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ality and to return to the standard which the constitutions have
delimited. It was a federal court sitting in West Virginia which
over a generation ago explained the compatibility of a search and
seizure rule which is based on the state's protective police duty
with the constitutional mandate against unreasonable searches and
seizures:
"There is, in the [Fourth A]mendment, no prohibition
against search or seizure without a warrant. Such a prohibi-
tion would have been subversive of the common law and fatal
to the safety of human life and the repression of crime."54
We must protect the citizen in his home against unreasonable
searches. "But we should not permit our knowledge that abuses
sometimes occur to give sinister coloration to procedures which are
basically reasonable."5 5 It should be added that if we would base
our rule of law on the assumption that our police administer the
law only by abuses, we would render a grave insult to the most
faithful and unassuming servants of our society, and would virtu-
ally render a testimonial of decadence for the American public life.
SummAY OF RuLEs
For the sake of clarity we are offering this summary of the
existing law as it appears to us, as it is evidenced by the words of
enlightened courts and leading scholars, and as it is consonant with
constitutional mandates:
(I) Under the state's office to protect the citizens against crim-
inal or disastrous attacks against life, liberty and property, it is
the duty of the police to respond to emergencies, and, upon certain
notice of such attacks, indicating a pending peril which permits
of no delay, to break and enter (after fruitless demand) the premises
in which the danger persists, and to take all necessary steps to guard
the threatened citizen or his property. Strictly speaking, these cases
lie outside the scope of what has developed into the law of search
and seizure, even though search and seizure may be involved inci-
dentally. Example: Problem question (a), supra.
(II) The constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches of dwellings implies the plermission of reasonable searches
54 Baker, J., in United States v. Snyder, 278 Fed. 650 (N.D.W.Va.
1922), reversed on another ground, 285 Fed. 1 (4th Cir. 1922), but not affect-
ing the language of this quote.
US Mr. Chief Justice Vinson in Harris v. United States, note 42 supra, at 155.
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of dwellings. Apart from searches under warrant, as to which
we have expressed no opinion here, dwellings may be searched
without a warrant in cases of pending peril to human life or the
administration of the criminal law. Such searches must be reason-
able. Reasonableness depends on the concurrence of good faith
on the part of the officer conducting the search-responding to the
emergency-, and perilous circumstances permitting of no delay for
the procurement of a warrant. Such instances are:
(1) Search of the immediate room of a dwelling in which a
lawful arrest is being made, and as an incident to such an arrest.
(2) Search of a dwelling in which a felony is being committed,
of which the searching officer has gained immediate reliable knowl-
edge through one of his senses, no matter whether, upon entry, the
perpetrator is actually apprehended on the premises or not.
(3) Search of a mobile home in cases where any delay would
render it impossible to prosecute for crime of which an officer of
the law has gained immediate knowledge.
(4) Search of a dwelling by an officer of the law who has gained
reliable information that a capital crime (or other serious felony?50 )
has been, or is being, or about to be, committed therein, and when
delay would occasion the removal, destruction or disappearance of
the evidence of the crime. Example: Problem question (b), supra.
While we can not predict what the courts will be called upon
to decide, we do offer a prediction as to how they will decide a case
in the nature of our two hypothetical cases, when called upon to
do so. For the meantime we humbly submit this guide, which rests
on common law, common sense, and the constitutions.
56 "Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to
obtain a warrant certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense
thought to be in progress... Mr. Justice Jackson in McDonald v. United
States, note 41 supra, at 459, concurring opinion. The Justice considered further
elements to be: the relation between the harm to be abated and the harm
incidental to abatement; the absence or presence of violence in the pending
peril; and whether the emergency situation consists of a crime which con-
stitutes a "vice, practiced in secrecy and discoverable only by crashing intn
dwelling houses." Ibid. See our concluding remarks in § 9 supra.
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